Harmonisation of disease management practices across global space and the devolution of responsibility to a broader range of actors are two increasingly important approaches for ordering biosecurity governance. While these forms of ordering have been examined individually, the social science biosecurity literature provides limited insights into how they interact and interfere with one another, and the consequences for biosecurity implementation. This paper draws upon an institutional logics approach to examine the different and competing logics through which government agencies, industry bodies and farming enterprises engage in biosecurity. It focuses specifically on the ways in which these logics pose challenges for harmonisation of biosecurity as well as create alternative spaces of negotiation for making life safe. Through the analysis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with government and industry stakeholders, as well as with beef producers, we identify three institutional logics being the neoliberal, productivist and agrarian logics. We argue that the existence of multiple logics poses significant challenges for efforts to achieve improved harmonisation of biosecurity in an environment of devolved responsibility to industry, farming bodies and producers. In this context, greater emphasis by stakeholders on the productivist logic holds the most potential for improving biosecurity implementation in that it works with existing agricultural circulations and flows, and with producers' herd health practices.
how harmonisation and the broadening of responsibility for surveillance interact as well as interfere with one another and the consequences for biosecurity implementation.
Drawing upon data from a qualitative study focusing on-farm biosecurity practices in the Australian beef industry, we apply an institutional logics framework to investigate two key issues: (1) the different and competing logics through which government agencies, industry bodies and farming enterprises engage in biosecurity and (2) the ways in which these logics contribute to challenges as well as opportunities in harmonising biosecurity among these actors. The term institutional logics refers broadly to the 'socially constructed, historical patterns of . . . practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules' (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804) that provide actors with guidelines about organisational processes and priorities, as well as roles and codes of conduct. We argue that although different agencies, organisations and actors with responsibility for biosecurity may ultimately share the same goals, each is influenced by its own logic meaning that the way in which they approach biosecurity policy and/or practice differs. Based on our analysis, we contend that participants discussed in this study engage in biosecurity from three different logics: the neoliberal logic, the productivist logic and the agrarian logic. Identifying the different logics that influence actors' biosecurity practices provides a useful starting point in understanding the challenges involved in efforts to harmonise biosecurity governance at the same time as devolving responsibility to a broader range of actors and organisations.
Harmonisation and the devolution of responsibility in biosecurity governance
Biosecurity is an established international policy concern influenced strongly by a number of international institutions and agreements, such as the World Organisation for Animal Health, International Plant Protection Convention, the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Donaldson, 2013; Maye et al., 2012) . The WTO is recognised as being particularly significant for the promotion of a range of standards aimed at 'harmonising national policies and practices so that differences are reduced and free trade is enhanced' (Dibden et al., 2011: 105) . Further, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) specifies processes and technical procedures that national governments should use to protect plant, animal or human health within their borders . This obliges national governments and their agencies to adopt a standardised approach to the management of disease risk by basing biosecurity measures on scientific principles and internationally recognised risk-assessment techniques. Such an approach involves what Law (2006) terms 'fluid engineering': the aspiration to control, stabilise and standardise material flows and exchanges on a global scale.
Despite ongoing efforts to harmonise international biosecurity governance, harmonisation continues to be a highly contested and political process, characterised by an 'uneven geography of biosecurity regulations, practices and procedures' (Enticott, 2014: 42) . This unevenness is evident at two particular levels; on an international scale between states and on a national scale between actors and agencies responsible for animal disease management. On an international scale, Maye et al. (2012) contend that despite pressure by the WTO to make biosecurity and trade liberalisation compatible objectives, inconsistencies exist in terms of how biosecurity is viewed and treated within different countries. For example, Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) vary across trade promotion and biosecurity protection, issue-specific variations in national policy stances, and how biosecurity 'risks' are constructed and prioritised. These inconsistencies draw attention to a 'complex geopolitics in the ways in which biosecurity is practised, institutionalised and debated in each country' (Maye et al., 2012: 150) . They also complicate other findings that view biosecurity and trade liberalisation as contradictory objectives (O'Neill and Fagan, 2006) , or as mutually compatible (Braun, 2007) .
On a national scale, Enticott (2014) demonstrates that neoliberal reforms to animal disease regulation in the UK have led to closer relationships between veterinarians and farmers -both of whom are key actors in animal disease surveillance and management. This in turn has contributed to unevenness in animal disease practices through a 'departure from standardised disease regulation ' (2014: 42) to flexibility in veterinary practices, which accommodate variations in disease diagnosis and interpretation of test results. Maye et al., Enticott and others provide valuable insights into the complex ways in which standardised approaches to biosecurity are 'contested and rendered workable' at different scales of governance (Dibden et al., 2011: 117) . They also draw attention to the implications for biosecurity governance posed by the participation of a growing range of actors, an issue we discuss in this paper.
In addition to pressure for uniformity, neoliberal reform has also involved a shift from governments taking a central role in the management of biosecurity risk towards a more devolved approach involving a broader range of actors. This approach has two inter-related dimensions. First, it encompasses a wider distribution of sites and spaces that are seen to require surveillance and a consequent broadening of responsibility for biosecurity governance . This shift is consistent with what Barker (2010) refers to as the emergence of biosecure citizenship, in which citizens are increasingly expected to participate in the surveillance and reporting of pests and diseases. Second, it involves devolving the costs and strategic direction for pest and disease management to farming industries and farmers (Donaldson, 2013; Enticott et al., 2012) . Evident particularly in the UK and Australia, this has allowed 'for disease prevention costs to be borne at the farm rather than by the consumer, the retailer or, importantly, the state' (Hinchliffe et al., 2013: 533) .
A consequence of the broadening and devolving of responsibility to non-state actors is that sub-national biosecurity governance is increasingly reliant 'on a disparate set of public and private institutions, each with its own set of objectives' (Cook et al., 2010 (Cook et al., : 1307 . This can be crucial for engaging groups of actors with limited previous input into biosecurity policy and programmes, prompting 'innovative and non-uniform solutions to animal health problems' (Enticott, 2008 (Enticott, : 1580 see also Enticott, 2014) . It can also reduce the dependence of agricultural biosecurity on 'the aspiration to uniformity' and the weaknesses of centralised systems of surveillance (Law, 2006: 238) . However, this approach also poses challenges for harmonising practices among the diverse actors responsible for biosecurity across national and global space. Other than the recognition that de-centralisation and devolution represent 'a countervailing pressure' to harmonisation (Hinchliffe et al., 2013: 534) , the disparities and tensions between these two neoliberal forms of ordering have received little attention by social scientists. Yet, these countervailing pressures create potential indeterminacy for biosecurity policy-makers (Hinchliffe, 2001) as well as ambiguity and tensions for agencies and farmers tasked with implementing biosecurity in practice, including unclear lines of responsibility, poor communication and lack of transparency (Palmer et al., 2009 ). This can create uncertainty and cynicism and can also cause farmers to ignore information from governing bodies with whom they have not yet established a relationship of trust. We argue that an institutional logics approach allows for investigation into how the ordering of biosecurity through the devolution of responsibility is challenged by competing goals and imperatives, and the tensions this creates for harmonising expectations and responsibilities amongst the actors involved in biosecurity governance.
Theoretical framework: Institutional logics Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) define an institutional logic as the: 'socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules . . . [that] provide meaning to [an individual's] social reality'. An institution's logic provides 'elements of order and predictability' (March and Olsen, 2006: 4) determining an organisation's purpose and mobilising action through the construction of norms and aims. As a theoretical framework, institutional logics have been used to explore and analyse 'interrelationships amongst institutions, individuals and organizations in social systems [as well as] how individual and organizational actors are influenced by their situation in multiple social locations' (Thornton et al., 2013: 2) . We apply an industrylevel approach in which the logics across and interrelationships between a number of organisations within the one industry or field are explored (Besharov and Smith, 2014) .
A core assumption that underpins institutional logics is that 'interests, identities, values and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded' (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 103) in the prevailing logic of the institution at the time. Consequently, the institution's logic 'focus decision maker attention on specific sets of issues and solutions (Ocasio, 1997) , and . . . influence organizations' decisions to adopt certain practices' (Shipilov et al., 2010: 846) . Another assumption is that the logic provides all organisational members with legitimacy and agency in terms of what their roles and priorities are and how they should act accordingly (March and Olsen, 2006) . However, this view assumes a shared understanding of the logic in which all actors, regardless of status or hierarchical position, interpret the logic in the same way. A limitation of this assumption is that it does not acknowledge the notion of organised anarchies (Cohen et al., 1972) in which organisations or industries are characterised by unclear preferences, misunderstood processes or fluid participation in which 'individuals drift in and out of decision-making, spending varied amounts of time and effort in different domains' (Ward et al., 2004: 293) . Consequently, assumptions of a shared understanding of a logic at an industry level does not provide insight into tensions and challenges that exist within a single logic or the multiple logics that can exist within the same industries.
Of particular concern to us in this paper is the notion of multiple logics, for we are interested in how multiple logics within the Australian beef industry compete with each other, creating challenges and tensions for stakeholders engaged in biosecurity practices. Scholars have argued that multiple logics have a negative impact for industries through the creation of conditions that promote higher levels of conflict and lower levels of performance (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Tracey et al., 2011) . Multiple logics can also cause confusion for individuals who are required to manage competing and possibly misunderstood priorities. The existence of multiple logics within a single industry can also create conditions in which particular logics become dominant or lack alignment with other logics.
In comparison, McPherson and Sauder (2013) argue that the existence of multiple logics is not necessarily problematic. At a macro level, multiple logics can prevent poor decisionmaking in the event that a dominant logic is flawed. For example, a review of the 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the UK attributed 'fundamental flaws in contemporary livestock systems and practices, and serious failings in the government oversight of the sector' (Ward et al., 2004: 296) to governmental institutional processes. That is, policy decisions were found to be outdated; agricultural problems were inappropriately framed, and the views of different stakeholders were marginalised leading to catastrophic consequences for the British livestock industry. At a micro level, multiple logics can provide tools for negotiation in which problems can be viewed from different perspectives, and individual actors can influence broader institutional processes (Battilana, 2006; Battilana et al., 2009) . Further, multiple logics provide negotiating actors with space for developing creative input and solutions into processes that might be viewed as predetermined through other logics.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we discuss three specific logics that emerged from the analysis of data. The first of these is the neoliberal logic, which is characterised by declining public resources for biosecurity at a sub-national level and the devolution of responsibility to industry bodies and farming organisations. We also explore the productivist logic in which the commercial viability of producers heavily influences how some producers and stakeholders understand and implement biosecurity. The third logic, we discuss is the agrarian logic. This logic reflects a view that governments are primarily responsible for biosecurity rather than different actors sharing responsibility for biosecurity governance.
Methods
The discussions in this paper have been drawn from a larger study exploring farm biosecurity practices and the management of emergency animal disease (EAD), funded by the Australian Commonwealth Government. The aim of the broader study was to explore beef producers' knowledge and practices regarding disease threats, and the implications for recognition and reporting of EAD. The research project was designed using an interpretivist approach, which enabled us to focus on individual experiences and interpretations of biosecurity. We developed a qualitative study that involved two phases of data collection and analysis. The first phase involved the collection and analysis of policy documents and grey literature (Coffey, 2013) focusing on EAD and biosecurity within the Australian context. The second phase of data collection involved semi-structured interviews (Patton, 2015) with 54 participants. Of the interviews, 20 were conducted with stakeholders from Commonwealth government departments, New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland (QLD) state government departments, peak industry organisations and local organisations involved in biosecurity implementation. The remaining interviews were conducted with beef producers with 20 interviews held with producers in the Riverina region of NSW and 14 in Far North Queensland. These regions were purposely chosen as they are the primary beef production zones in Australia.
We used the documentary data to develop an understanding of the current policies around biosecurity management and prevention, the roles that different stakeholder organisations and agencies play in Australian biosecurity, and to develop an understanding of each stakeholder organisation's values, goals and missions. Both the documentary and interview data were initially analysed using open and axial coding (Coffey, 2013; Miles and Huberman, 1994) as a way of firstly finding common descriptors and then the relationships around and between different descriptors. We then analysed the data thematically (Patton, 2015) to derive key themes from across the data. The three logics discussed throughout the remainder of this paper -the neoliberal logic, the productivist logic and the agrarian logic -are three of the themes that emerged from the data.
Neoliberal logic
To date, neoliberalism has been discussed in the biosecurity literature in the context of efforts by governance agencies, such as the WTO, to 'standardise flows and exchanges on a global scale' (Law, 2006: 238) . This has contributed to the growing influence of neoliberal rationalities on international biosecurity governance, in which trade liberalisation is rendered compatible with national biosecurity through WTO-sanctioned risk-assessment techniques, processes and metrics. These highly technocratic procedures seek to standardise the way that national biosecurity risks are assessed (Donaldson, 2013; Higgins and Dibden, 2011) at the same time as forestalling 'larger debates about the increasingly problematic relationship between international trade and the spread of diseases that threaten human, animal and plant life' (Potter, 2013: 132) .
Our research shows that neoliberal rationalities are increasingly influential also in biosecurity governance at a sub-national level, what we refer to as a neoliberal logic. However, neoliberalism discussed as part of this logic is somewhat different to how it has been discussed within the biosecurity literature to date. Rather than representing attempts to harmonise disease management practices, our findings draw attention to neoliberalism in the form of cuts to public sector funding and the devolution of responsibility to industry, which pose significant challenges for harmonisation. From our findings, it is evident that efforts by State government agencies to implement biosecurity programmes in partnership with other relevant stakeholders are constrained heavily by ongoing cutbacks in resources and staff, which Peck and Tickell (2002) refer to as 'roll-back' neoliberalism. This was evident in comments made by a representative from a national animal health organisation: I talk to [staff] on a daily basis and they keep saying, ''there are so few of us left and we are so busy we just don't have time for any of the things that we know that we should do or that we would like to do in the area that you're suggesting''.
A decline in funding to State government biosecurity agencies, and subsequent resource and staffing constraints, is linked directly to the role that Australian State governments play in animal disease prevention. For example, participants report that activities such as extension and working directly with producers have become compromised:
This last seven years with the department, it's just been shrinking; [they're] always closing [an] office; people leaving and not being replaced; we don't have the money for that; no we won't be doing that anymore. And so there's never been much emphasis on expanding our activities. We should be doing more extension, we should be talking. . . that hasn't happened. (Government Agency, Queensland -Participant 1) At government level . . . we have limited resources and so it's about prioritising that work against everything else and . . . there are less resources available to do other type of work which may be more proactive or preventative in nature. And that's unfortunate but that's how it is. (Government Agency, Queensland -Participant 2)
As a consequence of declining public resources, responsibility for biosecurity has been progressively devolved from governments to industry groups. For example, activities such as extension have diminished in organisations such as the NSW Department of Primary Industries and Queensland Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, yet these activities are essential for producers in disease surveillance, prevention and management.
There used to be a lot more stock inspectors . . . they've definitely reduced them in some areas. Such shifts in biosecurity responsibility are consistent with broader neoliberalising trends where states are increasingly using 'flanking mechanisms' (Jessop, 2002) , in which civil society groups take on roles that were previously the sole responsibility of governments. In the Australian context, an increased role for non-state actors and organisations is actively encouraged under the Commonwealth government's 'partnership' approach to biosecurity, and, as the following quotes illustrate, is welcomed by state agencies and industry bodies/ farming organisations alike.
To me that comes down to . . . greater extension and media awareness that's run by the industry and less reliance on government and Big Brother to do this for us. It really goes back to what's happening everywhere, a greater reliance on the part of industry and farmers in particular to be more accountable for their own biosecurity rather than relying on others. (Government Agency, NSW -Participant 1) I'm a big fan of this public/private partnerships now. We've got diminishing government resources, we've got diminishing industry resources. If the two can't amalgamate and drive for a common cause we're in more trouble than we know. (National Biosecurity Organisation) Cutbacks in government expenditure combined with the expectation that non-government organisations will take on increased responsibility for biosecurity, appear at face value to provide an enabling environment for industry bodies and farming organisations to contribute to and participate in biosecurity governance. However, declining government resources suggest that there is a shifting of responsibility rather than 'attempting to share biosecurity risks more formally with industry' (Donaldson, 2013: 62) . The expectation that non-government organisations take on a greater role in biosecurity governance is challenged by reports that the views of industry are not adequately listened to. This is evident in the following comments:
There is still a bit of a culture, [a] bit of a mindset in some government agencies that industry is a . . . hindrance to good government . . . I think if there was a greater sense of mutual cooperation . . . and a genuine sense . . . that this government agency really cared for the industry and the industry generally believed that the government was of value and relevance . . . then I think we'd achieve an awful lot more than we currently do (National Biosecurity Organisation).
We would like to play a greater role. . .. The whole response [to the Bovine Johnes Disease outbreak in Queensland] showed us that it was very poorly planned, there were no real systems in place, there was no biosecurity kind of disaster plan that pulled everyone together and said ''this is what's happening''. So I think as [a peak professional organisation] we'd certainly like to get more involved in that side of things. (Farming Organisation, Queensland -Participant 1)
Despite their willingness to contribute more extensively to biosecurity governance, the next logic that we discuss draws attention to challenges for farming organisations and industry bodies in taking on greater responsibility. We tease out these details in the following section.
Productivist logic
In broad terms, productivism 'refers to a discourse of agricultural organization in which the function of farming [is] singularly conceived as the production of food and fibre, and which prioritize[s] increasing agricultural production over all other considerations' (Woods, 2011: 67) . Unlike the neoliberal logic, which is concerned with exercising surveillance over the increasingly wide distribution of biosecurity borderlines, the productivist logic recognises borders as conduits ) that facilitate flows of trade and contribute to a competitive farming sector and viable farms. Such a discourse has long been evident in Australian agriculture. Up to the 1970s, agricultural policy was dominated by a state subsidised form of productivism. However, from the 1980s, successive Australian governments removed agricultural subsidies and embraced a more 'globalised' or 'competitive' form of productivism characterised by a neoliberal commitment to trade liberalisation and deregulation of economic activities (Dibden and Cocklin, 2005) . This 'competitive-productivist' orientation has placed significant pressures on farmers forcing them to increase efficiency to remain viable, or leave the industry. At the same time, such an orientation has become internalised in the moral economy of farming with productivism being favoured by industry and many farmers as the predominant way to organise agricultural activity (Cooper and Rosin, 2014; Lawrence et al., 2013) . We argue that an outcome of this is that farmers are likely to be reluctant to engage in activities, such as biosecurity, unless there are commercial incentives to do so. This has implications for the capacity of industry bodies and farming organisations to promote biosecurity activities to producers.
Participants from these bodies whom we interviewed recognise that productivism is important for beef producers, and as a consequence biosecurity planning is unlikely to be a high priority due to the lack of commercial incentives for adoption.
[Biosecurity is not] a priority because it's not pushing the hip pocket and it hasn't and it won't until you get a problem like BJD, or if you had a Foot and Mouth outbreak tomorrow you would have no worries packing the hall at Hughenden. (Representative from National Industry Organisation 1)
. . .if you were to say let's not worry about money, dollars and cents, I'm certain things could be done better but that's not the world we live in. (Representative from National Industry Organisation 2)
[Biosecurity is] just not, a) it's not really a sexy issue and b) it's not yet clear in their mind that it has commercial ramifications. The National Vendor Declaration Form has to be filled out if you're selling animals. Now the NVD focuses almost entirely on the quality of the product, the meat safety, the safety of the product. So NVD's focus on chemical treatments, they've been adopted very widely, almost 100% adoption. Why? Because the abattoirs won't buy unless there's an NVD with them, or if they do say they will buy them but it'll be at a discounted rate. So there's a commercial imperative immediately evident and so producers will fill them out. It's not a law for them to do so but it's a commercial imperative. That's not the case with biosecurity. (Representative from National Industry Organisation 3)
The significance of commercial considerations is demonstrated in our interviews with beef producers in which only those aspects of herd health planning with consequences for productivity were prioritised. Of note, biosecurity planning and surveillance involving longer term strategies to prevent exotic as well as endemic pest and disease incursions was considered as not directly relevant to productivity, and was therefore considered a much lower priority by producers. Indeed, only 1 producer out of the 34 interviewed in NSW and QLD reported having a formally documented biosecurity plan, and this was because they were required to as part of feedlot accreditation requirements. All other producers either had an informal plan or no plan at all.
The lack of commercial incentives for producers means that industry bodies and farming organisations face particular challenges in promoting and improving the uptake of on-farm biosecurity practices. On the one hand, they are expected to take on increasing responsibilities in national biosecurity governance. However, they also have an obligation to their members and member organisations to prioritise issues that have direct consequences for production and productivity. Under these circumstances, industry bodies and farming organisations argue that greater emphasis on commercial imperatives is needed to improve the priority given by producers to biosecurity planning. For example:
. . .we do sit on high up here at National level and make these policies and pontificate about all the wonderful things and agonise over the fine detail, where out there in producer land they . . .a good way of selling the message to producers is via their pocket. . .. When we say [an outbreak] could cost the industry $13B in a year, well phone book numbers really don't help. What you do . . . is say, ''on an average producers holding, this could cost you $150K in the first year or it could cost you $380K in the first'' . . . $300K is real money whereas $13B is someone else's usually. (Representative from National Biosecurity Organisation) From the perspective of these stakeholders, emphasising the commercial benefits of biosecurity practices is crucial in improving producer prioritisation and adoption. However, as we argue in the following section, the willingness of producers to accept the commercial benefits of adopting improved biosecurity practices is contingent on who they see as being ultimately responsible for biosecurity. A further challenge for industry bodies and farming organisations, as well as State government agencies who have responsibility for implementing biosecurity programmes, is the belief held by many beef producers that biosecurity is a government responsibility.
Agrarian logic
From the data, it was evident that beef producers consider biosecurity governance as the responsibility of government or their agencies, rather than being a shared responsibility. This attribution of 'ownership' of biosecurity to external agents, and especially government, is consistent with previous UK research on farm biosecurity (Heffernan et al., 2008) . We argue that Australian beef producers' attribution of responsibility for biosecurity to others is reflective of an agrarian logic. This logic has two important consequences for the devolution of responsibility in biosecurity governance. First, it problematises the redistribution of responsibility for biosecurity to farmers, and efforts to constitute them as biosecure citizens (Barker, 2010) . Second, it contests the increasingly broad distribution of borderlines, which includes farms, and seeks to (re)define the national border as the only legitimate borderline for 'walling in of ''good'' life and a walling out of risky lives' (Hinchliffe et al., 2013: 534) . In this context, biological threats are constructed as something that exists beyond national borders, rather than emerging from within. Consequently, the responsibility for keeping out such threats is assumed to lie with national governments.
The agrarian logic is based on the broader notion of agrarianism, which historically had a significant influence on the development of rural policy in the United States (Woods, 2010) . Flinn and Johnson's (1974) seminal work on agrarianism identifies five key tenets that have been influential in shaping sociological discussion and debate. These tenets argue that farming is the basic occupation on which all other economic pursuits depend; agricultural life is inherently good, while city life is artificial and evil; farming delivers complete independence for the farmer; farmers need to work hard to demonstrate the virtues of farming and family farms are intimately connected with American democracy.
In the Australian context, Aitkin (1985) argues that a particular form of agrarianism developed from around the 1920s which he terms country-mindedness. Similar to agrarianism, country-mindedness is a set of values in which farmers and farming are characterised as crucial elements of a society, and central to the development of the national character. One of the features of country-mindedness that is specifically relevant to an agrarian logic is the idea that 'Australia depends on its primary producers for its high standards of living . . . therefore, all those, from country and city alike, should in their own interests support policies aimed at improving the position of primary industries' (Aitkin, 1985: 35) . From this perspective, governments, and society more broadly, are viewed as having a moral responsibility to support farmers and family farming. Botterill (2009) contends that agrarianism has played an important role in the development of Australian rural policy, contributing to widespread and often unquestioned public support for government efforts to provide assistance to farmers through subsidies and other forms of intervention. Further, while the increasing dominance of neoliberal economics in rural policy-making means that agrarian influence is less obvious than it once was, it nonetheless remains very evident (Botterill, 2009) .
We agree that agrarianism remains in Australia for our data provide evidence that producers do not believe that biosecurity is their responsibility. Indeed, and as the following quotes illustrate, governments are viewed as having the legitimate responsibility for biosecurity in order to prevent external biological threats from disrupting the crucial work of producers in national food production.
It'd have to be government. . .. Have to be government because we haven't got the resources to do it ourselves and it's not our responsibility. And it's whether it's the northern Australia's coastline, or the bigger risk I think is Sydney Airport and Melbourne Airport, Adelaide Airport, all the containers coming in, it's got to be government; private can't do it. (NSW producer 12)
[Producers] do enough heavy lifting. We're providing shed cleaned beef for the whole nation as well as providing fairly significant exports for the economy and we're not getting paid for it as it is, so why should we need to do more? It's in the government's best interests to keep local food/ beef produced locally . . . Most governments stand on it as being part of their policy at election time . . . and yet they seem very hesitant about paying their share, paying their way. (QLD producer 5) While producers functioning within this logic are clear that responsibility for biosecurity does not rest with them, it is noteworthy that ambiguity as to which government agencies are responsible was evident within the data. For example:
Well it's got to be the government. Because they have the ability to make laws or change laws . . . and enforce laws. So they're the first body. And then I suppose it comes back to, well Local Land Services is part of them now, it's not separate, so that's probably the mechanism that they'll implement it through. And that goes for quarantine and customs and all that sort of thing. You can't go past the law can you? (NSW producer 14)
Well it's got to be the Federal Government if not the state [government] I think. States are irresponsible buggers and they sometimes see things in the view of states. I think you have to have . . . a federal backed body, which . . . they keep shuffling these things around from one acronym to another. But it's a very important issue and there has to be some involvement with Customs and Federal Police . . . (QLD producer 7)
For some producers, their payment of levies to the national research and development body Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) appeared to suggest that they had an obligation to take ultimate responsibility in the event of an outbreak.
I would say that the MLA should be the Body that would be at the forefront of it and the money that we pay for each animal/transaction should be, a part of that should be going into either that I suppose protection and/or education of what we're saying are these emergency diseases. (NSW producer 9) Well the MLA. . .. Because they're taking our $5 off us for no reason at all, they're not using it. And as soon as they get that down to $1 a head the better off everyone's going to be. It'd be different if they were using it but they're not. (NSW producer 18) While producers viewed biosecurity as a government responsibility, they also questioned the ability of governments and government agencies to be able to adequately address biosecurity threats in the event of an outbreak, a contradiction that has been identified in previous research (Heffernan et al., 2008) .
The government is reactive and all those departments are reactive, they're not proactive. Like they shut the gate after the horse has bolted . . . So it has become a culture within the government and all levels of government . . . We're out here on our own and the only time we hear from government is when something goes wrong. (QLD producer 10) Certain sections of government, media, public relations . . . they're disconnected in a lot of ways from the actual facts and circumstances that people are undergoing. I think the distancing from say Brisbane [state capital of Queensland] to what's actually happening in a paddock [is a problem]; they've got really no genuine desire or understanding to get to really be of assistance. (QLD producer 8) These quotes reflect a broader lack of trust in government that has been reported elsewhere in the biosecurity literature (e.g., Palmer et al., 2009 ). However, they are indicative also of a further key dimension of country-mindedness -the contrast between the artificiality of city life, where political power resides, and the authentic as well as ennobling virtues of farming and rural living (Aitkin, 1985) . From this perspective, city-based government agencies are assumed to have limited understanding of what 'really' goes on in rural areas, and the decisions that they make rarely reflect the lived realities of farmers and farming. Such views strongly influence producers' attitudes towards biosecurity governance and their willingness to become biosecure citizens (Barker, 2010) , taking greater responsibility for biosecurity surveillance. They call into question why responsibility for disease surveillance needs to be distributed away from state actors (see Hinchliffe et al., 2013) . In the following section of the paper, we identify and discuss some of these issues in more detail with specific emphasis on the influence that the neoliberal, productivist and agrarian logics can have for the harmonisation of biosecurity governance.
Discussion
Biosecurity governance at the sub-national level is characterised increasingly by the devolution of disease surveillance, responsibility and decision-making from state agencies to industries and farms (Donaldson, 2013; Enticott et al., 2012; Hinchliffe et al., 2013) , as well as to the broader public (Barker, 2010) . Devolution is argued by some scholars to provide an alternative mode of ordering to standardised systems of surveillance and disease control; one that makes possible more flexible, innovative and locally contextualised approaches to biosecurity governance (Enticott, 2008; Law, 2006) . However, through the application of an institutional logics approach to the Australian beef industry, this paper reveals multiple and contested logics among the actors involved in biosecurity governance. These logics raise doubts over the capacity and/or willingness of non-state as well as state organisations and actors to participate in a more devolved form of biosecurity governance.
At a State government level, we identified firstly the predominance of a neoliberal logic, which is characterised by cut-backs in public sector staffing and resources for biosecurity programmes. This 'roll-back' neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) restricts the capacity of State government agencies to invest in biosecurity extension as well as to work more extensively with other stakeholders. At the same time, there is the growing expectation that industry bodies and farming organisations will act as 'flanking mechanisms', (Jessop, 2002) filling this gap and taking on greater responsibility for improving farmer engagement with and adoption of biosecurity practices. Nevertheless, as our analysis of the second logicthe 'productivist' logic -revealed, industry bodies and farming organisations are not necessarily able to fully take on such responsibility due to the low priority given by their producer members to biosecurity and the imperative of addressing producers' productivityrelated concerns. This creates a tension between the promotion of biosecurity and the lack of existing productivity-related incentives for producer adoption of biosecurity practices. The productivist logic predominates among industry and farming organisations, as well as the beef producers serviced by those bodies, and is also consistent with the broader 'competitiveproductivist' orientation of the Australian Commonwealth government (see Dibden and Cocklin, 2005) .
In comparison, the third institutional logic, which we identified as the agrarian logic, provides a different perspective in which beef producers view governments and their agencies as having legitimate responsibility for biosecurity. This logic has significant implications for government efforts to take more of a 'partnership' and 'shared responsibility' approach that involves producers. That is, producers influenced by the agrarian logic appear to legitimately believe that managing biosecurity is not their responsibility, suggesting that the devolution of biosecurity to farms and farmers is unlikely to be easily achieved. In contrast, producers shaped by the productivist logic are more willing to engage in biosecurity management, but their decisions to do so are driven by commercial imperatives rather than a set of agrarian values. We acknowledge that a limitation of this study is that we have explored dominant logics that emerged across the different participant groups and the challenges these raise in terms of inter-group collaboration. Different logics are also likely to exist within rather than merely across different groups. For example, producers may approach farming from multiple versions of the agrarian logic influenced by state or regional differences, creating a different set of tensions for farm-level activities. This is also likely to be evident within government or other stakeholder groups in different regions or states, or even in rural versus urban areas. We argue that further research is warranted that focuses on the variations of logics within groups and the tensions that these create.
The identification of the above three logics -neoliberal, productivist and agrarianreveals that much like harmonisation as a mode of ordering, the devolution of responsibility is also a contested and political process. More importantly, the identification of multiple logics raises questions over whether, and to what extent, the devolution of responsibility for biosecurity governance can be made compatible with aspirations for organisational integration and harmonisation. We argue that the existence of multiple logics poses significant challenges for the harmonisation of biosecurity governance, particularly in terms of determining who is responsible and what each actor should do in the event of an emergency disease outbreak. Each logic provides order and predictability for organisations and individuals within them (March and Olsen, 2006) , guiding how different participants view biosecurity. From the data, it is evident that producers and stakeholders approach biosecurity from vastly different perspectives.
On a day-to-day basis, these competing logics may not have a significant impact on the threat and spread of pests and diseases as producers attend to issues pertaining to herd health as part of their fundamental farming operations. However, in the event of a sudden animal disease outbreak, such as FMD, multiple logics guiding different actors can create confusion in terms of who is responsible for what, leading to inaction, slow or poor decision-making. This is particularly likely if different actors are unsure of their roles and responsibilities, or deem themselves as not having legitimacy to act (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) . For example, producers who approach biosecurity from the agrarian logic may legitimately believe that they do not have the authority to act in the event of an emergency disease outbreak, while government agencies functioning from a neoliberal logic could view the producer as being central to reporting and managing emergency disease in the first instance. The divergence between these logics is likely to deepen the existing perception among producers that governments are disconnected from the 'realities' of rural life making it even more difficult for governments to engage producers in taking more responsibility for biosecurity.
Equally, industry bodies and farming organisations that approach biosecurity from the productivist logic may be unsure of how to act, or lack legitimacy to do so, as they are caught between supporting their members and contributing to government strategies that may impact on the short-term productivity of producers affected by disease. We argue that such diverse views highlight the likelihood of low compatibility between logics (Besharov and Smith, 2014) , particularly the neoliberal and agrarian logics. That is, if producers and government agencies operate from logics in which each believes the other is responsible for biosecurity management, the ability of both to work together and perform at a high level (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) in the event of a disease outbreak is compromised. Overall, the low compatibility between logics that we have identified builds on previous social science research that highlights the problems and limits involved in efforts to harmonise biosecurity practices across national and global space. As responsibility for biosecurity governance is devolved to a broader range of actors, agencies and organisations, efforts to promote harmonisation in biosecurity planning and practices will prove an ongoing challenge. Nevertheless, as we argue below, harmonisation is not entirely incompatible with the broadening of participation in biosecurity governance.
In many ways, the identification of multiple logics in biosecurity is not entirely surprising, as multiple logics are evident across many different types of industries (Besharov and Smith, 2014) . Further, governments and government agents, stakeholders and producers all have vastly different roles and purposes and are subsequently socialised into different practices, cultures, norms and beliefs (Schein, 1990 (Schein, , 2002 around disease management. At face value this underlines Law's (2006) argument that it is not 'possible to engineer a culture of safety across the whole of the agricultural system'. Yet, while efforts to harmonise across multiple logics may prove challenging for governing agencies, harmonisation and the devolution or responsibility are not necessarily irreconcilable modes of ordering. Drawing upon the work of Enticott (2008 Enticott ( : 1574 , we argue that efforts to make biosecurity workable rely on a careful balance between the 'construction of spatial singularity and standardisation' and the creation of 'alternative spaces of negotiation', which emphasise flexibility, negotiation and the multiplicity of flows and practices. In this context, it is worth considering how the logics might create such an alternative space, connecting producers' existing production and herd health practices to the broader objective of making life safe.
Logics not only provide guidelines for action, they also influence actors' responses to change (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004) . For example, logics that promote flexibility and innovation are more likely to influence early uptake of changes amongst actors (Jay, 2013) . In comparison, logics that promote established routines and patterns of behaviour may see actors less likely to perceive the need for change (Gilbert, 2005) . Logics also have the capacity to influence change adoption through the language and communication used within different organisations (Lammers, 2011; Suddaby, 2010) . That is, communication shapes the way that biosecurity information is interpreted and understood by actors, which can influence farmers' decisions about whether changes to biosecurity are necessary, and ultimately, decisions around adoption. In others words, if biosecurity policies are communicated by government to producers using media or language that are difficult to access or understand, the importance of biosecurity adoption may be overlooked or ignored.
Agrarianism provides a good example of a logic that promotes established patterns of behaviour. If producers approach biosecurity from an agrarian logic, they might either ignore recommended changes from government agencies or actively resist them. Comparatively, the productivist logic provides potentially greater scope for influencing changes to producers' biosecurity practices. For example, stakeholders who emphasise the productivity gains that farmers can achieve through the implementation of biosecurity practices are more likely to provide arguments for adoption that resonate with producers. That is, the productivist logic is more likely to draw attention to the benefits of biosecurity adoption compared with the neoliberal logic in which responsibility is shifted to the producer. Further, the productivist logic shifts emphasis away from biosecurity surveillance as a producer responsibility for which they must bear the financial cost. In this regard, we argue that a greater emphasis by stakeholders on the productivist logic could create an 'alternative space of negotiation' (Enticott, 2008 (Enticott, : 1574 for promoting the adoption of biosecurity practices.
The introduction of more explicit incentives -especially if linked to existing herd health programmes, which are widely supported by producers -provides a possible alternative that would enable producers to integrate biosecurity planning and surveillance into their existing production and herd health systems, without imposing additional costs. At the same time, the provision of incentives has the potential to shift the expectation that biosecurity is primarily a government responsibility -characteristic of the agrarian logic -and to cultivate a more engaged and inclusive form of biosecure citizenship among producers (see Barker, 2010) . Significantly, the productivist logic is oriented towards maintaining and working with existing agricultural circulations, flows and practices. In doing so, this logic questions the 'will to closure' in biosecurity governance (Hinchliffe et al., 2013: 533) , which is argued to 'make security counter-productive' by interfering with 'the very circulations that make life flourish' (Hinchliffe, 2013: 210) . It provides the scope for a different biopolitics that engages in more direct ways with the everyday circulations and flows of animal production, herd health and livestock movement.
Yet, in an environment of diminishing government resources and public sector cutbacks such an option may not be politically or financially feasible, and governments may be unwilling to commit funds for activities that they view producers should be doing anyway. It is important also to acknowledge that financial/economic considerations are not the only factors driving farmers' adoption practices. Personal values and goals, lifestyle considerations and perceived risk play a crucial role in farmers' land management and business strategies (e.g., Bohnet et al., 2011; Burton, 2004; Greiner et al., 2009 ). For instance, in our study, it is likely that financial incentives would have limited effectiveness for those producers committed to an agrarian logic who view biosecurity as government responsibility. There is no doubt that external incentives -including financial -are effective for farmers whose main motivations are financial/economic (Greiner et al., 2009 ). However, in general, a broader range of activities is needed to foster biosecurity collective action by farmers. These include a mix of regulatory, fiscal and nudging policies (Barnes et al., 2015) , as well as the use of social networks at a community level, and greater producer participation in the design of biosecurity policy and practice (Heffernan et al., 2008) . More research is needed on how different policy instruments and approaches may contribute to overcoming the low priority currently given to biosecurity by producers.
Conclusion
The identification of multiple institutional logics in biosecurity governance represents the key contribution of this paper. These logics provide important insights into the challenges as well as opportunities for governing authorities in their efforts to improve the harmonisation of national biosecurity governance. Nonetheless, the logics discussed in this paper reflect the strong agricultural orientation of biosecurity within Australia. A key task of future research should be to identify the institutional logics that characterise biosecurity governance in other national political contexts as the basis for comparative analysis. In addition, more detailed research is needed on the institutional logics within organisations and agencies involved in biosecurity policy and planning, and the consequences for intra-and inter-organisational harmonisation of biosecurity practices. Comparative research across different national contexts as well as in-depth organisational research is crucial in developing the research in this paper and further illuminating the complexities in holding together different orderings of biosecurity governance.
